container-security
# Container Security Skill
What this skill does
# Container Security Skill
> **USE WHEN:** Securing Docker containers, Kubernetes deployments, or reviewing container configurations.
> **DO NOT USE FOR:** General Docker usage (use docker skill), Kubernetes architecture (use kubernetes skill).
## Docker Security Best Practices
### Dockerfile Hardening
```dockerfile
# Bad: Running as root
FROM node:20
WORKDIR /app
COPY . .
RUN npm install
CMD ["node", "server.js"]
# Good: Non-root user, minimal image, multi-stage
FROM node:20-alpine AS builder
WORKDIR /app
COPY package*.json ./
RUN npm ci --only=production
COPY . .
RUN npm run build
FROM node:20-alpine
WORKDIR /app
# Create non-root user
RUN addgroup -g 1001 -S nodejs && \
adduser -S nodejs -u 1001 -G nodejs
# Copy only necessary files
COPY --from=builder --chown=nodejs:nodejs /app/dist ./dist
COPY --from=builder --chown=nodejs:nodejs /app/node_modules ./node_modules
COPY --from=builder --chown=nodejs:nodejs /app/package.json ./
USER nodejs
EXPOSE 3000
# Health check
HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=3s --start-period=5s --retries=3 \
CMD wget --no-verbose --tries=1 --spider http://localhost:3000/health || exit 1
CMD ["node", "dist/server.js"]
```
### Minimal Base Images
| Image Type | Security Level | Use Case |
|------------|----------------|----------|
| `scratch` | Highest | Go/Rust static binaries |
| `distroless` | Very High | Java, Node.js, Python |
| `alpine` | High | General purpose |
| `slim` | Medium | Debian minimal |
| `full` | Low | Development only |
```dockerfile
# Distroless for Java
FROM gcr.io/distroless/java21-debian12
COPY --chown=nonroot:nonroot target/app.jar /app.jar
USER nonroot
CMD ["app.jar"]
# Distroless for Node.js
FROM gcr.io/distroless/nodejs20-debian12
COPY --chown=nonroot:nonroot dist/ /app/
WORKDIR /app
USER nonroot
CMD ["server.js"]
```
### Image Scanning
```bash
# Trivy (comprehensive)
trivy image myapp:latest
trivy image --severity HIGH,CRITICAL myapp:latest
trivy image --ignore-unfixed myapp:latest
# Docker Scout
docker scout cves myapp:latest
docker scout recommendations myapp:latest
# Grype
grype myapp:latest
# Snyk
snyk container test myapp:latest
```
### Docker Daemon Security
```json
// /etc/docker/daemon.json
{
"icc": false,
"userns-remap": "default",
"no-new-privileges": true,
"live-restore": true,
"userland-proxy": false,
"log-driver": "json-file",
"log-opts": {
"max-size": "10m",
"max-file": "3"
}
}
```
## Container Runtime Security
### Docker Run Security Options
```bash
# Bad: Full privileges
docker run --privileged myapp
# Good: Minimal privileges
docker run \
--security-opt=no-new-privileges:true \
--cap-drop=ALL \
--cap-add=NET_BIND_SERVICE \
--read-only \
--tmpfs /tmp:rw,noexec,nosuid \
--user 1001:1001 \
--memory=512m \
--cpu-shares=512 \
--pids-limit=100 \
myapp
```
### Capabilities Reference
| Capability | Purpose | Usually Needed |
|------------|---------|----------------|
| `NET_BIND_SERVICE` | Bind ports < 1024 | Sometimes |
| `CHOWN` | Change file ownership | Rarely |
| `SETUID/SETGID` | Change UID/GID | Rarely |
| `SYS_ADMIN` | Admin operations | Never in prod |
| `SYS_PTRACE` | Debugging | Never in prod |
### Docker Compose Security
```yaml
version: '3.8'
services:
app:
image: myapp:latest
user: "1001:1001"
read_only: true
security_opt:
- no-new-privileges:true
cap_drop:
- ALL
cap_add:
- NET_BIND_SERVICE
tmpfs:
- /tmp:rw,noexec,nosuid,size=64m
deploy:
resources:
limits:
cpus: '0.5'
memory: 512M
pids: 100
reservations:
memory: 256M
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "wget", "--spider", "-q", "http://localhost:3000/health"]
interval: 30s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
networks:
- internal
secrets:
- db_password
db:
image: postgres:16-alpine
user: "70:70" # postgres user
volumes:
- db_data:/var/lib/postgresql/data:rw
environment:
POSTGRES_PASSWORD_FILE: /run/secrets/db_password
networks:
- internal
networks:
internal:
driver: bridge
internal: true
secrets:
db_password:
file: ./secrets/db_password.txt
volumes:
db_data:
```
## Kubernetes Security
### Pod Security Standards
```yaml
# Restricted Pod (highest security)
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: secure-app
spec:
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 1001
runAsGroup: 1001
fsGroup: 1001
seccompProfile:
type: RuntimeDefault
containers:
- name: app
image: myapp:latest
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
capabilities:
drop:
- ALL
resources:
limits:
cpu: "500m"
memory: "512Mi"
ephemeral-storage: "1Gi"
requests:
cpu: "100m"
memory: "256Mi"
volumeMounts:
- name: tmp
mountPath: /tmp
- name: cache
mountPath: /app/.cache
volumes:
- name: tmp
emptyDir:
medium: Memory
sizeLimit: 64Mi
- name: cache
emptyDir:
sizeLimit: 128Mi
automountServiceAccountToken: false
```
### Pod Security Admission
```yaml
# Namespace with enforced security
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
name: production
labels:
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: restricted
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce-version: latest
pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit: restricted
pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn: restricted
```
### Network Policies
```yaml
# Deny all by default
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: default-deny-all
namespace: production
spec:
podSelector: {}
policyTypes:
- Ingress
- Egress
---
# Allow specific traffic
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: allow-app-to-db
namespace: production
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app: myapp
policyTypes:
- Egress
egress:
- to:
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app: postgres
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 5432
```
### RBAC Best Practices
```yaml
# Minimal ServiceAccount
apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
name: myapp
namespace: production
automountServiceAccountToken: false
---
# Minimal Role
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
name: myapp-role
namespace: production
rules:
- apiGroups: [""]
resources: ["configmaps"]
resourceNames: ["myapp-config"]
verbs: ["get"]
---
# RoleBinding
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: RoleBinding
metadata:
name: myapp-binding
namespace: production
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: myapp
namespace: production
roleRef:
kind: Role
name: myapp-role
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
```
### Secrets Management
```yaml
# Bad: Plain secret in manifest
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
name: db-credentials
stringData:
password: "mysecretpassword" # Don't commit this!
# Good: External Secrets Operator
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1beta1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
name: db-credentials
spec:
refreshInterval: 1h
secretStoreRef:
name: vault-backend
kind: ClusterSecretStore
target:
name: db-credentials
data:
- secretKey: password
remoteRef:
key: secret/data/production/db
property: password
```
## Container Scanning in CI/CD
```yaml
# GitHub Actions
name: Container Security
on:
push:
branches: [main]
jobs:
scan:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Build image
run: docker build -t myapp:${{ github.sha }} .
- name: Trivy scan
uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@master
with:
image-ref: myapp:${{ github.sha }}
format: 'sarif'
output: 'trivy-results.sarif'
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