fnox-security-best-practices
Use when implementing secure secrets management with Fnox. Covers encryption, key management, access control, and security hardening.
What this skill does
# Fnox - Security Best Practices
Security guidelines and best practices for managing secrets with Fnox.
## Encryption Fundamentals
### Always Encrypt Sensitive Data
```toml
# Bad: Plain text secrets committed to git
[secrets]
DATABASE_PASSWORD = "super-secret-password"
API_KEY = "sk-live-12345"
# Good: Encrypted secrets
[providers.age]
type = "age"
public_keys = ["age1ql3z..."]
[secrets]
DATABASE_PASSWORD = { provider = "age", value = "age[...]" }
API_KEY = { provider = "age", value = "age[...]" }
```
### Use Strong Encryption
```bash
# Good: age encryption (modern, secure)
age-keygen -o ~/.config/fnox/keys/identity.txt
# Good: Cloud KMS (managed encryption)
[providers.kms]
type = "aws-kms"
key_id = "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:..."
```
## Key Management
### Protect Private Keys
```bash
# Store age private key securely
chmod 600 ~/.config/fnox/keys/identity.txt
# Never commit private keys
echo "*.txt" >> ~/.config/fnox/keys/.gitignore
```
### Separate Public and Private Keys
```toml
# fnox.toml (committed) - public keys only
[providers.age]
type = "age"
public_keys = ["age1ql3z7hjy54pw3hyww5ayyfg7zqgvc7w3j2elw8zmrj2kg5sfn9aqmcac8p"]
# fnox.local.toml (gitignored) - private keys
[providers.age]
identity = "~/.config/fnox/keys/identity.txt"
```
### Rotate Keys Regularly
```bash
# Generate new age key
age-keygen -o ~/.config/fnox/keys/identity-2025.txt
# Re-encrypt all secrets with new key
fnox get --all | fnox set --provider age-new
```
## Access Control
### Use Least Privilege
```toml
# Good: Separate secrets by environment
[profiles.production]
[profiles.production.providers.prod-secrets]
type = "aws-sm"
region = "us-east-1"
[profiles.production.secrets]
DATABASE_URL = { provider = "prod-secrets", value = "prod/db" }
[profiles.development]
[profiles.development.secrets]
DATABASE_URL = "postgresql://localhost/dev" # Non-sensitive
```
### Team Access Control
```toml
# Multiple age recipients for team
[providers.age]
type = "age"
public_keys = [
"age1ql3z...", # Alice (admin)
"age1qw4r...", # Bob (developer)
# Don't include contractors or temporary team members
]
```
### Role-Based Secrets
```toml
# Backend secrets
[providers.backend]
type = "aws-sm"
region = "us-east-1"
# Frontend secrets (different access level)
[providers.frontend]
type = "aws-sm"
region = "us-east-1"
[secrets]
BACKEND_DB_PASSWORD = { provider = "backend", value = "backend/db-pass" }
FRONTEND_API_ENDPOINT = { provider = "frontend", value = "frontend/api-url" }
```
## Git Security
### Never Commit Sensitive Data
```gitignore
# .gitignore
fnox.local.toml
*.age-identity.txt
*.key
*.pem
.env
```
### Audit Git History
```bash
# Check for accidentally committed secrets
git log -p | grep -i "password\|secret\|key"
# Remove secrets from git history (if found)
git filter-branch --force --index-filter \
'git rm --cached --ignore-unmatch fnox.local.toml' \
--prune-empty --tag-name-filter cat -- --all
```
### Use Pre-Commit Hooks
```bash
# .git/hooks/pre-commit
#!/bin/bash
if git diff --cached --name-only | grep -q "fnox.local.toml"; then
echo "Error: Attempting to commit fnox.local.toml"
exit 1
fi
# Check for plain text secrets
if git diff --cached | grep -q "password.*=.*\"[^a]"; then
echo "Warning: Possible plain text password detected"
exit 1
fi
```
## Environment Separation
### Separate Development and Production
```toml
# fnox.toml (development)
[secrets]
DATABASE_URL = "postgresql://localhost/dev"
DEBUG = "true"
# fnox.production.toml (production secrets)
[providers.prod]
type = "aws-sm"
region = "us-east-1"
[secrets]
DATABASE_URL = { provider = "prod", value = "prod/db-url" }
DEBUG = "false"
```
### Use Profiles for Environments
```bash
# Development
fnox exec -- node app.js
# Staging
FNOX_PROFILE=staging fnox exec -- node app.js
# Production
FNOX_PROFILE=production fnox exec -- node app.js
```
## Cloud Provider Security
### AWS Best Practices
```toml
# Use IAM roles instead of access keys
[providers.aws-sm]
type = "aws-sm"
region = "us-east-1"
# No access_key_id or secret_access_key
# Uses IAM role or AWS credentials chain
# Restrict by resource tags
[providers.aws-sm]
type = "aws-sm"
region = "us-east-1"
# Ensure IAM policy limits access to specific secrets
```
### Azure Best Practices
```toml
# Use managed identity
[providers.azure]
type = "azure-kv"
vault_url = "https://my-vault.vault.azure.net"
# Authentication via Azure managed identity
```
### GCP Best Practices
```toml
# Use service account with minimal permissions
[providers.gcp]
type = "gcp-sm"
project_id = "my-project"
# Service account with only secretmanager.versions.access
```
## Audit and Monitoring
### Log Secret Access
```bash
# Enable audit logging in cloud providers
# AWS CloudTrail for Secrets Manager
# Azure Monitor for Key Vault
# GCP Cloud Audit Logs for Secret Manager
```
### Monitor for Anomalies
```bash
# Check which secrets are accessed
fnox list
# Verify provider configuration
fnox doctor
# Test provider connectivity
fnox provider test aws-sm
```
### Regular Security Audits
```bash
# List all secrets
fnox list
# Verify encryption status
fnox doctor
# Check for plain text secrets
grep -r "password.*=.*\"[^a]" fnox.toml
```
## Secrets Lifecycle
### Rotate Secrets Regularly
```bash
# Generate new secret
NEW_PASSWORD=$(openssl rand -base64 32)
# Update in fnox
echo "$NEW_PASSWORD" | fnox set DATABASE_PASSWORD
# Update in actual service (database, API, etc.)
# Then verify application still works
```
### Remove Obsolete Secrets
```bash
# Remove unused secret
fnox unset OLD_API_KEY
# Clean up from cloud provider
aws secretsmanager delete-secret --secret-id old/api-key
```
### Document Secret Purpose
```toml
[secrets]
STRIPE_API_KEY = {
provider = "age",
value = "age[...]",
description = "Stripe secret key for payment processing. Rotate quarterly."
}
DATABASE_PASSWORD = {
provider = "aws-sm",
value = "prod/db-password",
description = "PostgreSQL master password. Last rotated: 2025-01-01"
}
```
## CI/CD Security
### Use Dedicated CI Keys
```toml
# Separate age key for CI/CD
[providers.age]
type = "age"
public_keys = [
"age1ql3z...", # Developer key
"age1ci3d...", # CI/CD key (limited access)
]
```
### Restrict CI Secret Access
```yaml
# .github/workflows/deploy.yml
env:
FNOX_PROFILE: production
# Use GitHub secrets for age identity
AGE_IDENTITY: ${{ secrets.AGE_IDENTITY }}
steps:
- name: Load secrets
run: |
echo "$AGE_IDENTITY" > /tmp/identity.txt
chmod 600 /tmp/identity.txt
fnox exec -- ./deploy.sh
rm /tmp/identity.txt
```
### Minimal CI Permissions
```toml
# CI profile with minimal secrets
[profiles.ci]
[profiles.ci.secrets]
DEPLOY_TOKEN = { provider = "age", value = "age[...]" }
# Don't include database passwords or API keys
```
## Best Practices Summary
### DO
✅ Always encrypt sensitive secrets
✅ Use strong encryption (age, KMS)
✅ Store private keys securely
✅ Separate dev and prod secrets
✅ Use .gitignore for local overrides
✅ Rotate keys and secrets regularly
✅ Use cloud provider managed identities
✅ Audit secret access
✅ Document secret purpose
✅ Use profiles for environments
### DON'T
❌ Never commit private keys
❌ Never use plain text for sensitive data
❌ Don't share private keys between team members
❌ Don't hardcode credentials
❌ Don't mix dev and prod secrets
❌ Don't skip encryption in production
❌ Don't ignore security warnings
❌ Don't use weak passwords as secrets
## Common Threats and Mitigations
### Threat: Accidental Commit
```bash
# Mitigation: Pre-commit hooks
cat > .git/hooks/pre-commit <<'EOF'
#!/bin/bash
if git diff --cached fnox.local.toml > /dev/null; then
echo "Error: fnox.local.toml should not be committed"
exit 1
fi
EOF
chmod +x .git/hooks/pre-commit
```
### Threat: Key Compromise
```bash
# Mitigation: Immediate rotation
# 1. Generate new key
age-keygen -o ~/.config/fnox/keys/identity-new.txt
# 2. Re-encrypt all secrets
fnoxRelated in Security
mac-ops
IncludedComprehensive macOS workstation operations — diagnose kernel panics, identify failing drives, audit launchd startup items, decode wake reasons, triage TCC permission denials, manage APFS snapshots, recover from no-boot. Use for: Mac is slow, slow bootup, won't boot, kernel panic, kernel_task hot, mds_stores CPU, photoanalysisd, cloudd, login loop, gray screen, sleep wake failure, drive failing, IO errors, APFS snapshots eating space, Time Machine local snapshots, Spotlight indexing, launchd, LaunchAgent, LaunchDaemon, login items, TCC permissions, Full Disk Access, Screen Recording denied, Gatekeeper, quarantine, com.apple.quarantine, app is damaged, helper tool, /Library/PrivilegedHelperTools, pmset, wake reasons, dark wake, sysdiagnose, panic.ips, DiagnosticReports, configuration profile, MDM profile, remote diagnostics over SSH.
a11y-audit
IncludedRun accessibility audits on web projects combining automated scanning (axe-core, Lighthouse) with WCAG 2.1 AA compliance mapping, manual check guidance, and structured reporting. Output is configurable: markdown report only, markdown plus machine-readable JSON, or markdown plus issue tracker integration. Use this skill whenever the user mentions "accessibility audit", "a11y audit", "WCAG audit", "accessibility check", "compliance scan", or asks to check a web project for accessibility issues. Also trigger when the user wants to verify WCAG conformance or map findings to a specific standard (CAN-ASC-6.2, EN 301 549, ADA/AODA).
erpclaw
IncludedAI-native ERP system with self-extending OS. Full accounting, invoicing, inventory, purchasing, tax, billing, HR, payroll, advanced accounting (ASC 606/842, intercompany, consolidation), and financial reporting. 413 actions across 14 domains, 43 expansion modules. Constitutional guardrails, adversarial audit, schema migration. Double-entry GL, immutable audit trail, US GAAP.
assess
IncludedAssesses and rates quality 0-10 across multiple dimensions (correctness, maintainability, security, performance, testability, simplicity) with pros/cons analysis. Compares against project conventions and prior decisions from memory. Produces structured evaluation reports with actionable improvement suggestions. Use when evaluating code, designs, architectures, or comparing alternative approaches.
spring-boot-security-jwt
IncludedProvides JWT authentication and authorization patterns for Spring Boot 3.5.x covering token generation with JJWT, Bearer/cookie authentication, database/OAuth2 integration, and RBAC/permission-based access control using Spring Security 6.x. Use when implementing authentication or authorization in Spring Boot applications.
code-hardcode-audit
IncludedDetect hardcoded values, magic numbers, and leaked secrets. TRIGGERS - hardcode audit, magic numbers, PLR2004, secret scanning.